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JL he February collapse of Drexel
Burnham Lambert, which followed five
months of turmoil in the junk bond mar-
ket, signaled the end of a six-year period
of sustained growth of that market Prices
of lower-grade bonds declined sharply
from September 1989 through February
1990. In the secondary market, some in-
vestors found it difficult to locate buyers
for their securities. In the primary mar-
ket, new issues during January 1990
were only one-third of their value a year
earlier. New issues during all of 1989
decreased by 11 percent from the 1988
total of $27 billion, while mutual fund in-
vestment in high-yield bonds fell from
$34 billion to $28 billion.
1 These
events, triggered by financial distress in
a number of leveraged buyouts that in-
cluded the slide of the Campeau Corpo-
ration into bankruptcy, have engendered
predictions of the demise of the modem
high-yield market
This Economic Commentary reviews
the growth of that market from virtual
nonexistence in 1980 to nearly $200
billion by the end of the decade, and as-
sesses the impact of recent events on
its viability. Three trends in debt forma-
tion that contributed to the rapid expan-
sion of the high-yield market are dis-
cussed. The first is the overall growth
of the economy, which contributed to
the rapid expansion of both equity and
debt during the 1980s. The second is
the substitution of credit-market debt
for bank loans in the balance sheets of
middle-market customers who had not
previously enjoyed access to the bond
market The third is the wave of
leveraged restructuring induced by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Volume patterns in the bond market,
especially the high-yield market, sug-
gest that the third phenomenon may
have played itself out. The tax code,
however, still provides both investors
and corporations with a strong incentive
to elect debt rather than equity as a
vehicle for financing new investment.
Moreover, the dynamic middle-market
customers who fueled the growth of this
market prior to 1986 continue to repre-
sent profitable lending opportunities.
The high-yield market will shrink if in-
vestors, shaken by recent events, with-
draw their capital, but the economic
forces that created the market persist,
and it is quite unlikely that high-yield
bonds will disappear altogether.
• Economic Growth and Debt
Formation
Between 1980 and 1989, nominal gross
national product expanded at an annual
rate of 7 percent. Businesses spent $3.6
trillion on new plant and equipment
during this period, while outstanding
credit-market debt on the balance sheets
of domestic nonfinancial corporations
increased by $1.2 trillion. Other factors
influenced the formation of credit-
market debt during the 1980s, but the
contribution of economic growth to this
phenomenon should not be overlooked.
Did the collapse of Drexel Burnham
Lambert in February signal the end
of the high-yield debt market? Con-
sidering that the economic forces
responsible for creating the market
remain in place, it is unlikely that
junk bonds will disappear any time
soon.
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Figure 1 shows gross private domestic
investment and net new credit-market
debt over the course of the decade.
As always, new debt formation closely
tracks the behavior of investment.
(The year of the Tax Reform Act is an
obvious exception.) Figure 2 portrays
the behavior of equity prices, an in-
dicator of expected future investment
opportunities. Equity markets supplied
firms with a strong positive signal
about the value of investment oppor-
tunities throughout the 1980s, con-
tributing to the willingness of busi-
nesses to borrow.
• Credit-Market Debt and Bank
Loans
It is convenient for the sake of discus-
sion to partition the decade into three
time periods, although the division is
somewhat arbitrary. The first period is
1980-1982, which precedes the growth
of the high-yield market and serves as a
useful reference point. During the
second period, between 1983 and 1985,
high-yield bonds became a significant
component of new corporate lending,
capturing an increasing share of a grow-
ing debt market from commercial
banks. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
marks the beginning of the third period,
when the composition of the high-yield
market shifted from middle-market
firms seeking to finance new invest-
ment toward tax-driven restructuring.
Bank loans and corporate bonds make
up the bulk of debt on the corporate
balance sheet throughout the decade, as
they have during the entire postwar
period. Balance-sheet data indicate that
the combined market share of these
two sources of funding remained
steady during the 1980s, never varying
outside a range of 70 to 75 percent.
There was, however, a clear trend
toward the use of credit-market debt
throughout the decade. Figure 3 shows
the steady decline of a composite of
bank loans, finance company debt, and
mortgage debt relative to security
market debt that began in the 1970s.
5
The share of these items in outstanding
debt understates trends in new lending
activity. Figure 4 portrays the year-to-
year change in outstanding bank loans,
corporate bonds, and speculative-grade
bonds during the 1980s.
6 Between
1980 and 1982, bank lending accounted
for 57 percent of net new corporate
credit, while bonds accounted for only
36 percent of that amount. The share of
bank lending in net new credit fell byTABLE 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH-YIELD ISSUERS





















SOURCE: G. Yago (1988—see footnote 7). All figures are percentages.
half, to 26 percent, between 1983 and
1985, while the share of bonds remained
steady at 35 percent. Between 1986 and
1988, bank lending accounted for only
15 percent of new credit, while the share
of bonds nearly doubled to 61 percent.
The overall growth in debt, and the sub-
stitution of bonds for bank loans, fueled
the growth of the high-yield market.
New issues of speculative-grade bonds
rose from $1.5 billion in 1982 to $15
billion during 1984. During this period,
Drexel Bumham Lambert underwrote
virtually 100 percent of the new issues.
The strategy that proved so successful
at Drexel was the marketing of debt, is-
sued by middle-market firms that had
previously depended on banks for
credit, directly to sophisticated inves-
tors. Insurance companies and pension
funds provided most of the capital ab-
sorbed by the high-yield market be-
tween 1982 and 1984. By 1986, the
public had become involved more
directly through mutual funds.
The leveraged buyouts and leveraged
restructurings of recent years have
focused attention on a type of high-
yield issuer that differs significantly
from the representative borrower of
1983-1986. In a broad survey of U.S.
industrial firms covering the period
1980-1986, Yago profiles the issuers of
high-yield bonds and contrasts these
firms with other U.S. industrial com-
panies.
7 Table 1 presents some of the
findings from this study. Firms in the
sample that used high-yield finance are
dynamic enterprises, with growth in
sales, employment, and investment that
exceeds that of other industrials. Only 3
percent of the firms in the sample that
issued high-yield debt used the pro-
ceeds for merger or acquisition activity.
The forces that resulted in the substitu-
tion of credit-market debt for bank
loans on corporate balance sheets dur-
ing this period are poorly understood.
Plausible explanations include a regu-
latory burden for banks, conservatism
in lending induced by the onus of Third-
World debt, and advances in informa-
tion technology that made it possible
for investors to monitor the perfor-
mance of smaller firms directly, making
it unnecessary to rely on banks for those
services. The evidence necessary to dis-
criminate among these explanations has
not yet been accumulated.
It is, however, possible to dismiss on
the basis of currently available
evidence at least one other explanation
of the substitution of bonds for bank
debt. Thrift institutions received sig-
nificant new investment powers under
legislation passed in the early 1980s,
which enabled them to invest in high-
yield bonds.
8 Some thrifts became ac-
tive investors in the high-yield market.
However, thrift industry investment in
high-yield issues, which peaked at a
total of $13 billion in 1986, accounted
for only 8 percent of outstanding high-
yield issues during that year. Thrift
holdings of high-yield debt were never
a significant portion of either total
thrift industry assets or outstanding
high-yield debt.
• The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The biggest year of the decade in the
high-yield debt market was not 1988,
when leveraged buyout activity reached
its zenith, but rather 1986, when the
U.S. Congress enacted what may well
be the most significant revisions of the
tax code in this century. Two features of
the Tax Reform Act provide corpora-
tions with a strong incentive to sub-
stitute debt for equity on the corporate
balance sheet. At the corporate level,
the curtailment of non-debt tax shields
such as the investment tax credit and
depreciation allowances eliminated im-
portant alternatives to debt for protect-
ing corporate earnings from taxation.
9
At the personal level, the abolishment
of preferential treatment for capital
gains enhanced the after-tax value of
debt relative to equity. The combina-
tion of these factors provided a strong
impetus for increased leverage between
1986 and 1989.
Financial economists have long
believed that the financial structure of
corporations is sensitive to the tax en-
vironment. When corporate taxes are
calculated, interest payments to inves-
tors who hold debt are deductible,
while dividend payments to investors
who hold equity are not. This feature
of the tax code provides firms with a
powerful incentive to finance invest-
ment through the issue of debt. That
incentive is mitigated by firms' prefer-
ence for the flexibility associated with
equity (or equivalently, an aversion to
the financial distress that may result
from excess leverage), and by the avail-
ability of tax deductions other than
interest payments on debt Changes in
the tax code that reduce the availability
of non-debt tax shields tilt the balance
between debt and equity in favor of
increased debt.
Hard empirical evidence concerning
the relationship between the tax code
and corporate financial structure has
heretofore proved elusive, probably be-
cause of measurement problems in-
herent in financial accounting, and the
imprecise timing of tax code revisions.
But the Tax Reform Act resulted in
such a drastic, instantaneous change inFIGURE 3 DEBT STRUCTURE OF U.S. NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
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the tax environment that it has been
possible to detect a response in cor-
porate financial policy. A recent study
using a diverse set of U.S. industrial
companies documents a $140 increase
in outstanding debt in response to each
$100 decrease in non-debt tax shields
associated with the Tax Reform Act.
Moreover, the observed response of in-
dividual firms depends on the dividend
policy of the firm prior to the change,
suggesting that changes in the personal
tax code also affected the financial
structure of corporations.
It is also possible to observe a response
to the Tax Reform Act in aggregate
data. The deviation in the relationship
between investment activity and debt
formation that is apparent in figure 1
has already been noted. Commercial
and industrial lending, and new issues
of both investment-grade bonds and
speculative-grade bonds, all increased
sharply in 1986. Equity repurchases
surged the following year: net issues of
equity were negative in 1987. The ac-
cumulation of debt following tax reform
increased the ratio of debt to equity in
all nonfinancial corporations from 0.67
to 0.75 between 1985 and 1988.
• Leverage, Debt Quality, and
Defaults
The accumulation of debt in the 1980s
represents a significant increase in the
fixed obligations of corporations. How-
ever, during a period when the value of
debt on the corporate balance sheet
grew by 150 percent, the market value
of equity increased by 175 percent, so
that the debt-to-equity ratio of nonfinan-
cial corporations actually declined
slightly over the past 10 years. As fig-
ure 5 shows, debt-to-equity ratios are
currently less than they were during




leverage in U.S. industrial corporations
is greater than it was during the 1950s
and 1960s, the shift toward more debt
in capital structures occurred during the
1970s, not the 1980s.
Nor has there been any widespread
decline in debt quality, despite frequent
reports to the contrary in the popular
press. Moody's Investor Services
reports that issues rated Aaa (the firm's
highest rating) constituted the most
rapidly expanding category of bonds be-
tween 1977 and 1989. Issues rated B
(the lowest rating for which figures are
reported) did take second place in the
growth sweepstakes, but by 1989, Aaa
issues represented 33 percent of all out-
standing issues rated by Moody's, while
B-rated issues constituted only 8 per-FIGURE 5 LEVERAGE IN NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
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cent of the total. (Recall that the
high-yield category was minuscule com-
pared to the investment-grade category
at the beginning of the decade.)
This is not to say that high-yield debt is
of the same quality as investment-grade
debt Recent defaults among rums that
experienced leveraged buyouts during
the 1980s have called our attention to a
simple fact: high-yield bonds bear high
yields because they are riskier than
investment-grade bonds. A number of
studies report 10-year cumulative
default rates on B -rated issues of 30 per-
cent. In contrast, investment-grade
issues enjoy cumulative default rates on
the order of 1 or 2 percent.
1
4 The
greater default rates associated with
high-yield bonds should not surprise in-
vestors: Hickman reported a similar dis-
crepancy in default rates for the 1900-
1943 period in his 1958 study. (The
default rates reported by Hickman are
higher than the modem experience for
both investment-grade issues and
speculative-grade issues. At least part of
the difference is attributable to the fact
that the Great Depression is included in
his sample.)
A feature of default experience that is
far more significant than the average
default rate is the sensitivity of defaults
to overall business conditions. Defaults
among high-quality issues are not espe-
cially sensitive to economic growth. In
contrast, defaults among lower-grade is-
sues are affected significantly by the
level of business activity. The implica-
tion of this sensitivity is that the onset
of a recession is likely to be associated
with financial distress among a number
of high-yield issuers. The $6 billion in
total 1989 defaults, which occurred
during a year when economic growth
slowed but did not stop, are a reminder
of this fact.
The possibility of widespread financial
distress among corporate borrowers
merits careful consideration from
policymakers. Recent analyses of the
severe economic depressions that
marked the nineteenth century and the
first part of the twentieth century sug-
gest that the collapse of credit markets
played an important role in these
episodes. But the mechanism that in-
duced the collapse of credit appears to
have been a significant deflation, or
downward revision in expected infla-
tion, which decreased corporate
revenues while the value of debt obliga-
tions remained fixed, leaving bor-
rowers unable to pay their bills or ob-
tain new credit. The behavior of the
money supply and the price level in the
United States during the postwar
period indicates that this scenario is un-
likely, although not impossible.
Moreover, the nonchalant reception
that the bankruptcy of Drexel Bumham
Lambert received in credit markets sug-
gests that isolated incidents are not apt




The spectacular growth of corporate
debt during the 1980s was accompanied
by the equally spectacular growth of the
high-yield bond market. Attributing
these phenomena to fads or to greed ig-
nores the fact that neither explanation
represents a new force on Wall Street '-r
in the world at large. Financial innova
tion and the significant restructuring o'
the U.S. tax code are explanations that
hold up much better to careful scrutiny.
Recent events are likely to result in in-
creased caution among investors, but
the high-yield bond market was created
by forces that persist today, and it is un-
likely to follow into oblivion the firm
credited with its inception.
• Footnotes
1. Price and volume statistics were supplied
by IDD Information Services.
Z There was an active market in the U.S.
for below-investment-grade bonds between
1900 and 1945. See W. Braddock Hickman,
Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Ex-
perience. Princeton: The Princeton Univer-
sity Press and the National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1958.
3. Business investment in plant and equip-
ment is taken from table C-54 of the
Economic Report of the President, February
1990. Credit-market debt figures are from
Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
October 1989.
4. The difference between investment and
credit-market debt is accounted for by
retained earnings.5. The first composite consists of debt
created through intermediaries, while the
second focuses on securities issued directly
by the firm. The appropriate category for
some items (mortgage debt and tax-exempt
bonds) is not always clear, but the trend is
not sensitive to variations in the definition of
the two categories.
6. The data for changes in bank loans and
outstanding bonds are from Balance Sheets
for the U.S. Economy, op. cit. The overall
bond category is comprehensive, encompass-
ing private placements, speculative-grade
debt, and convertible debt. The speculative-
grade debt figures are for public, nonconvert-
ible debt only, as reported in E. Altman, "The
Nature of the Market for High-Yield Bonds:
Nature of the Market and Effect on Federally
Insured Institutions," Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, May 1988. If
private placements were included in the
speculative-grade debt series, it would be sig-
nificantly greater.
7. See Glen Yago, Testimony submitted to
the U.S. General Accounting Office hearings
on high-yield bonds, U.S. General Account-
ing Office, 1988.
8. The Gam-St Germain Act of 1982
provided thrift institutions with the authority
to participate in a wide variety of new invest-
ment activities, including investment in high-
yield bonds.
9. The elimination of the investment tax
credit alone was designed to raise an addi-
tional $118 billion in revenue at the cor-
porate level between 1987 and 1991. See
Joint Committee on Taxation, "Summary of
Conference Agreement on HR 3838, The Tax
Reform Act of 1986," August 29,1986.
10. Prior to 1986,60 percent of long-term
capital gains were exempt from taxation. In-
dividuals currently enjoy a greatly reduced
incentive for realizing profits in the form of
capital gains rather than interest or dividends.
11. See D. Givoly, C. Hayn, A. Ofer, and O.
Sang, 'Taxes and Capital Structure:
Evidence from Firms' Response to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986," Working Paper,
Northwestern University, December 1989.
By observing individual firms before and
after the Tax Reform Act, these authors are
able to circumvent some of the measurement
problems that plagued previous studies and
document a number of responses to the tax-
law revision.
12. The impact of rising equity prices on this
relationship is reflected in the value of the
Standard & Poor's 500 index, which in- >
creased by 210 percent between 1979 and
1989. Equity repurchases explain why the
market value of outstanding equity grew less
rapidly than equity prices. Figures for debt
and equity values are from Balance Sheets
for the U.S. Economy, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
13. "Historical Default Rates of Corporate
Bond Issuers: 1970 Through 1988," Moody's
Investor Services, July 1989.
14. See E. Altman, "Measuring Corporate
Bond Mortality and Performance," Journal
of Finance, vol. 44 (September 1989), pp.
909-22; P. Asquith, D. Mullins, and E. Wolff,
"Original Issue High Yield Bonds: Aging
Analyses of Defaults, Exchanges and Calls,"
Journal of Finance, vol. 44 (September
1989), pp. 923-52; and Moody's, on. cit. All
of these studies report similar figures.
15. See B. Bemanke, "Nonmonetary Effects
of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of
the Great Depression," American Economic
Review, vol. 63 (1983), pp. 257-76; and
Charles Calomiris and R. Glenn Hubbard,
"Price Flexibility, Credit Availability, and
Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from the
United States, 1894-1909," Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, vol. 104 (August 1989),
pp. 429-52.
16. Historically, widespread banking panics
not accompanied by a severe downward
revision in price expectations are quite rare.
Runs against individual banks associated
with fears of financial weakness (that were
often warranted) were much more frequent.
See Charles Calomiris and Charles Kahn,
"Demandable Debt as the Optimal Banking
Contract," Working Paper, Northwestern
University, July 1989.
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